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et al.: Preemption of Local Law by State Legislature

PREEMPTION OF LOCAL LAW
BY STATE LEGISLATURE
N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c):
In addition to powers granted in the statute of local government
or any other law, (i) every local government shall have power to
adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions
of this constitution or any general law relating to its property,
affairs or government and, (ii) every local government shall have
power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the
provisions of this constitution or any general law relating to the
following subjects, whether or not they relate to the property,
affairs or government of such local government, except to the
extent that the legislature shall restrict the adoption of such a
local law relating to other than the property, affairs or
government of such local government ....
COURT OF APPEALS
Incorporated Village of Nyack v. Daytop Village, Inc. 66 8
(decided November 25, 1991)

The Village of Nyack (Village), brought this appeal seeking to
reverse the appellate court order that stayed an injunction against
Daytop Village, Inc. (Daytop), from operating a residential drug
rehabilitation home in a zone sited for commercial use. 6 6 9
Daytop claimed that village zoning laws were preempted by the
State's Mental Hygiene Law. 6 7 0 The court of appeals, finding no
inherent inconsistency between local zoning laws and state policy
for the treatment of substance abuse, held that Daytop must
67 1
comply with the Village's zoning process.
668. 78 N.Y.2d 500, 583 N.E.2d 928, 577 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1991).
669. Id. at 504, 583 N.E.2d at 929, 577 N.Y.S.2d at 216.

670. Id. at 506, 583 N.E.2d at 930, 577 N.Y.S.2d at 217; see N.Y.
§§ 19.01-19.25 (McKinney 1988).
671. Daytop Village, 78 N.Y.2d at 504, 583 N.E.2d at 929, 577 N.Y.S.2d
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Daytop proposed to operate a residential substance abuse
treatment program in a former hotel located in a commercial zone
in the Village of Nyack. 67 2 Daytop applied for and received a
certificate of approval from the New York State Division of
Substance Abuse Services. However, Daytop failed to apply for a
variance from the Village to operate a residential drug treatment
facility in a commercial zone. 673
Consequently, the Village obtained a temporary injunction
from the supreme court restraining Daytop from operating its
facility pending application for and receipt of such variance. 67 4
The appellate division reversed, holding that under the doctrines
of inconsistency and preemption, Daytop need not comply with
local zoning laws because the laws tended to inhibit the
implementation of a comprehensive state-wide policy for the
treatment of substance abuse. 675
The court of appeals, in reversing the appellate division's order, found that the Village's interest in regulating development
within its borders was not preempted by state regulation of the
licensing of substance abuse facilities. 676 The court stated that the
test of preemption is "not whether the local law prohibits conduct
which is permitted by State law" but whether the state, in acting
upon a subject, "'has evidenced a desire that its regulations
should pre-empt the possibility of varying local regulations.' 677
Pursuant to section 2(c) of article IX of the New York State
Constitution, "local governments do possess broad authority to
enact legislation that promotes the welfare of their citizens ....
[However,] they cannot adopt laws that are inconsistent with the
' 67 8
Constitution or with any general law of the State.
at 217.

672. Id. at 503-04, 583 N.E.2d at 929, 577 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
673. Id. at 504, 583 N.E.2d at 929, 577 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
674. Id.
675. Id. at 504, 583 N.E.2d at 929, 577 N.Y.S.2d at 216-17.
676. Id. at 508, 583 N.E.2d at 932, 577 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
677. Id. at 508, 583 N.E.2d at 931, 577 N.Y.S.2d at 218-19 (quoting
People v. Cook, 34 N.Y.2d 100, 109, 312 N.E.2d 452, 457, 356 N.Y.S.2d
259, 267 (1974)).
678. Id. at 505, 583 N.E.2d at 929-30, 577 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
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If the state has demonstrated that it intended to preempt an entire field, then any local laws regulating that field are held to be
inconsistent and will not be given effect. 679 It is presumed that
local laws, if "'permitted to operate in a field preempted by State
law, would tend to inhibit the operation of the State's general law
and thereby thwart operation of the State's overriding policy concerns.' ' 680 The legislature's intent to preempt a particular area
can be inferred from a declaration of policy or from a comprehensive detailed scheme in a given area. However, the fact that
both "'State and local laws touch upon the same area is insuffi681
cient to support a determination that the State has preempted"'
all local regulation.
The state substance abuse programs established under the New
York Mental Hygiene Law 682 can be cooperative in nature,
683
implemented by a joint effort of state and local officials.
Having examined the statute, the legislative history and the
applicable regulations, 684 the court concluded that the legislature
did not intend the statute's declaration of policy to preempt local
regulation of the location of facilities through the application of
zoning laws. 6 85 Nor had the Village tailored its zoning laws to
block the placement of substance facilities within its borders. The
court held the zoning ordinance to be within the authority of the
Village to impose, and not preempted by state regulation.
Therefore, Daytop was required to obtain a variance before it
686
could lawfully operate its facility.
6 87
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
679. Id. at 505, 583 N.E.2d at 930, 577 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
680. Id. (quoting Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. County of Suffolk, 71 N.Y.2d 91,
97, 518 N.E.2d 903, 905-06, 524 N.Y.S.2d 8, 11 (1987)).
681. Id. (quotingJancyn Mfg. Corp., 71 N.Y.2d at 99, 518 N.E.2d at 907,
524 N.Y.S.2d at 12).
682. N.Y. MiENTALHYG. LAW §§ 19.01-19.25 (McKinney 1988).
683. Daytop Village, 78 N.Y.2d at 507, 583 N.E.2d at 931, 577 N.Y.S.2d
at 218.
684. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 14, §§ 1010-1030 (1984).
685. Daytop Village, 78 N.Y.2d at 507, 583 N.E.2d at 931, 577 N.Y.S.2d
at 218.
686. Id. at 508, 583 N.E.2d at 931-32, 577 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
687. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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similarly provides that federal laws shall preempt inconsistent
state and local laws. Congress' intent to supersede state law in6 88a
given area may be explicit in the terms of the statute.
Otherwise, such intent may be implied when the scheme of
federal regulation is "so pervasive" or if the federal interest
involved is "'so dominant that the federal system will be assumed
6 89
to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject."'
Finally, "[e]ven when Congress has not chosen to occupy a
particular field, preemption may occur to the extent that state and
federal law actually conflict." ' 690 Such conflict exists when the
local law "'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
69 1
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'
In Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, the plaintiff, a property owner, challenged a town ordinance requiring a permit for
692 The
the aerial application of pesticides to private land.
plaintiff, who was denied such a permit, claimed that the
regulation of pesticides by local governments was preempted by
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA).

693

FIFRA is a comprehensive federal statute regulating the production, labeling, sale and use of pesticides. 694 The plaintiff
claimed that the town ordinance stood "as an obstacle to the
statute's goals of promoting pesticide regulation that is coordinated solely on the federal and state levels ...

"695 The Court

found, instead, that FIFRA implied a regulatory partnership
which included local government as well.
The Court stated that FIFRA "does not expressly or impliedly
preclude regulatory action by political subdivisions with regard to

688. Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2481 (1991).
689. Id. at 2481-82 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.

218, 230 (1947)).
690. Id. at 2482.
691. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
692. Id. at 2480.

693. Id. at 2479; see also 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-13 6 y (1989 & Supp. 1991).
694. Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor, 111 S. Ct. at 2479-80.

695. Id. at 2487.
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